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Objective prior distributions represent an important tool
that allows one to have the advantages of using theBayesian
framework even when information about the parameters
of amodel is not available. The usual objective approaches
work off the chosen statistical model and in themajority of
cases the resulting prior is improper, which can pose limita-
tions to a practical implementation, even when the complex-
ity of the model is moderate. In this paper we propose to
take a novel look at the construction of objective prior distri-
butions, where the connectionwith a chosen sampling distri-
butionmodel is removed. We explore the notion of defining
objective prior distributions which allow one to have some
degreeofflexibility, in particular in exhibiting somedesirable
features, such as being proper, or centered on specific val-
ueswhichwould be of interest in nestedmodel comparisons.
The basic tool we use are proper scoring rules and themain
result is a class of objective prior distributions that can be
employed in scenarios where the usual model based priors
fail, such asmixturemodels andmodel selection via Bayes
factors. In addition, we show that the proposed class of pri-
ors is the result of minimising the information it contains,
providing solid interpretation to themethod.
K E YWORD S
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21 | INTRODUCTION
With the ever increasing popularity of Bayesianmethods, attributable largely to the advent ofMarkov chainMonte
Carlomethods and other sampling techniques, the need for default, otherwise known as objective or noninformative,
priors is also in demand. Model based objective priors, such as the reference prior (Berger et al., 2009) and Jeffreys
prior (Jeffreys, 1961), are commonly used when available. However, as models become larger andmore complex, so it is
that such priors are becomingmore difficult to obtain, if not altogether unavailable. Indeed, it is our contention that
model based objective priors have now reached their natural ceiling with little progress or advances in recent years.
Some recent developments include a class of prior for hierarchical models, introduced by Simpson et al. (2017), though
these penalizing complexity priors are not considered objective in the usual sense. For a recent comprehensive review
of objective Bayesian procedures we refer the reader to Consonni et al. (2018).
Our observation is that limits to the progress in the research on objective priors is connected to their improperness. In
fact, with very few exceptions, objective priors are improper. Although this may not represent a problem, as long as the
posterior is proper, it causes severe limitations to the use of objective prior distributions, as we discuss in Section 1.1.
Indeed, the improperness of objective priors is the main motivation which brought us to investigate a novel approach to
derive objective priors.
Before proceeding further, it is important to provide some background. We argue that the Bayesian prior is given by the
probability measure Π on a suitable space of density functions and constructed from statistical model f (· |θ), θ ∈ Θ, and
probability density p(θ) onΘ, via
Π(f ∈ A) =
∫
{θ: f (·|θ)∈A}
p(θ) dθ,
for all measurable sets A. This is a more direct interpretation of the prior and avoids the inconvenient separation
between Bayesian parametric and nonparametric methods. Indeed, it is useful to visualize Bayesian inference as
the generation of a random density and associated functions; even if one is only considering random normal density
functions. From this perspective, the two components that are traditionally known as the likelihood, f (· |θ), and the
prior, p(θ), are mere tools used for constructing Π and, perhaps, the reasons for this nomenclature aremore historical
than accurate.
Hence, the priorΠ can never be assigned completely on objective grounds, as the function f (· |θ) is assigned as a result of
a subjective choice, based on good reasons. However, the function p(θ) can be derived through some objective method,
making the actual prior Π a combination of subjective and objective choices. This said, it is puzzling to understandwhy
p(θ) and f (· |θ) need to feed off each other in any way; other than the θ in both needs to be sitting in the same parameter
spaceΘ.
Consequently, in this paper we investigate the possibility of defining objective prior distributions that are notmodel
dependent and based on the sole knowledge of the parameter spaceΘ. The p(θ) using onlyΘ loses the connection with
the subjective component of Π and could be argued as a consequence to bemore objective. Conversely, model based
priors, such as the Jeffreys prior or the reference prior, necessarily include the subjective choice of themodel. In fact,
models are by and largemisspecified and, consequently, model based priors are propagating this misspecification. So,
while amodel based prior reinforces the connection between themisspecifiedmodel and the prior itself, a prior that
depends on the parameter space loses only the connection.
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1.1 Improper priors
Most limitations to the use of model based objective priors lie in the fact that they are improper. In Section 1.2 we
discuss somemotivating examples where the lack of properness in the prior makes them unsuitable. Here, wewould
like to present more general issues widely discussed in the literature.
A thorough discussion of the problems that improper priors cause can be found in Kass andWasserman (1996), where
they illustrate the following five issues:
1. Incoherence, strong inconsistencies and nonconglomerability;
2. Dominating effect of the prior;
3. Inadmissibility;
4. Marginalisation paradoxes;
5. Improper posteriors.
Although points 1. to 4. are undoubtedly important and noteworthy, it is probably the last issue that requires careful
consideration. Themain concern is that, as of today, general results that allow one to assess if a given improper prior
yields a proper posterior are yet to be found. Research has progressed on a case by case basis; for example, see Ibrahim
and Laud (1991) for the use of Jeffreys prior in generalised linearmodels, extended to overdispersedmodels of the same
kind by Dey et al. (1993), Natarajan andMcCulloch (1995), Berger and Strawderman (1993), and Yand and Chen (1995).
More recently, Rubio and Steel (2018) describe general conditions to use improper priors for linear mixedmodels with
longitudinal and survival data. However, the key point is that when one wishes to use (improper) objective priors, unless
they have been used before for that specific case, extensive work is required to ensure that the posterior is proper. As
one would expect, the task becomesmore onerous themore complex themodel is. But, even for simple models, the
risk is high; as, for example, the discussion in Vallejos and Steel (2013) about the use of the Jeffreys rule prior for the
Student-t regressionmodel derived in Fonseca et al. (2008) shows.
The above limitations imposed by improperness of model based objective priors lead us to the development of amethod
that allows objectivity of the prior and properness to coexist.
1.2 Motivating examples
The following four sections give an idea of the challenges that the use of improper priors may pose, even for simple
problems, and highlight the need for objective prior distributions that have the flexibility, when needed, of being proper.
1.2.1 Mixturemodels
A powerful tool in statistical analysis is represented bymixtures models. Due to their flexibility, mixtures of probability
distributions allow models suitable for complex data by building on simple components. As an example, consider a
mixture of normal densities,
f (x ) =
k∑
j=1
ωjN (x |µj ,σ2j ), (1)
where k is a positive integer, including∞, and the (ωj , µj ,σj ) are the collection of parameters of themixturemodel. Even
under the scenario when k is known, the reference prior for model (1) has yet to be derived, and Jeffreys prior can only
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be obtained under specific conditions; see Grazian and Robert (2018). Furthermore, this type of model is subject to
other issues related to non-identifiability and unbounded likelihoods, among others. The issuesmainly rise from the fact
that improper priors may not be appropriate as wemight not observe outcomes from every component of themixture
(Titterington et al., 1985). For example, Grazian and Robert (2018) show that Jeffreys prior is suitable for mixtures of
normal densities only in certain circumstances; that is, when the unknown parameters are the weights. If the unknown
parameters are themeans or the variances, then using Jeffreys prior may lead to improper posteriors. In particular, if
the unknown parameters are themeans only, proper posteriors exist only when the number of mixture components is
at most two; while, if the unknown parameters are the variance, or themean and the variances, then Jeffreys prior is not
suitable for inference. The above issues can be generalised to apply to any type of mixturemodel.
1.2.2 Bayes factors
Another simple case where objective priors are problematic is in model comparison (or selection) via Bayes factors. So,
if we wish to comparemodelM1 = {f1(x |θ1), p1(θ1)} to modelM2 = {f2(x |θ2), p2(θ2)}, where both θ1 and θ2 are vector
of parameters with some elements not in common, then the Bayes factor
B12 =
∫
f1(x |θ1)p1(θ1) dθ1∫
f2(x |θ2)p2(θ2) dθ2
,
is, in general, meaningful if the priors assigned to non-common parameters are proper. If not, then the arbitrary
multiplicative constant up to which they are defined do not cancel and the Bayes factor depends on an arbitrary
constant. Solutions to the issue have been proposed, see for example O’Hagan (1995) and Berger and Pericchi (1996),
however, the resulting procedures are still quite tedious to implement and are limited to simplemodels. By and large
the above issue stays; however, Berger et al. (1998) give an exception of the issue.
1.2.3 Hierarchical models
Improper priors may not always be usedwith hierarchical models. Consider the following simple example fromKass and
Wasserman (1996),
yi |µi ,σ ∼ N (µi ,σ2)
µi |τ ∼ N (µ, τ2),
for i = 1, . . . , n . Assuming σ is known, one could adopt the objective prior pi(µ, τ) ∝ τ−1, which is improper. However,
the (marginal) posteriors are improper. Oneway of overcoming this issue is to use proper priors that approximate the
behaviour of the objective priors, whichmeans proper and vague densities (or uniform distributions on a compact set);
due to the arbitrariness of the choices involved, the above are obviously not viable solutions in an objective context.
1.2.4 Other issues related to the use of improper priors
There aremany issues, practical and foundational, deriving from the use of improper priors. For example, themarginali-
sation paradox (Stone and Dawid, 1972), related to the use of improper priors for multi-dimensional parameter spaces,
or the Stein’s paradox (Bernardo and Smith, 1994), related to the use of vague proper priors (or uniform priors on
1.3 THE IDEA: OVERVIEW 5
compact sets). Another issue goes under the name of strong inconsistency, illustrated by the following example taken
from Syversveen (1998). Consider observations from the normal density N (µ,σ2), where the variance is known, and
define the event E = { |x | ≥ µ }. From themodel, we have
P (E |µ) = 1
2
+ Φ
(
−2 |µ |√n/σ
)
>
1
2
.
Since P (E |µ) > 1/2 for all the values of µ, we conclude that P (E ) > 1/2, and the posterior for E , assuming p(µ) ∝ 1, is
given by
P (E |x ) = 1
2
− Φ
(
−2 |x |√n/σ
)
<
1
2
.
As P (E |x ) < 1/2 for all values of x , we conclude that P (E ) < 1/2, showing inconsistency between the sampling
distribution and the posterior.
1.3 The idea: Overview
In this section we give an overview of the idea we propose to derive a class of objective prior distributions that depends
on the parameter space only. While a formal presentation will be discussed later on, we deem it appropriate to present,
at least at an intuitive level, the ideas here.
The key to the idea is to consider a loss function l (θ, p(θ))which penalizes for each θ ∈ Θ a choice of a prior density p(θ).
The objective criterion is then based on the idea of finding the class of p whichmakes l (θ, p(θ)) constant. For obvious
reasons, the loss function should have the following property∫
l (θ, p(θ))q (θ)dθ ≥
∫
l (θ, q (θ))q (θ)dθ, (2)
for all q ’s representing a density for the θ. In other words, if a “true” density for θ exists, the expected loss should be
minimisedwhen such a density is chosen. The condition in (2) identifies a particular class of loss functions, known as
proper scoring rules. One way of interpreting (proper) scoring rules is as loss functions that measure the quality of a
quoted density p for an uncertain quantity θ; see for example Parry et al. (2012). We indicate proper scoring rules as
S (θ, p), and we ask it to be constant for all θ ∈ Θ. So we set
S (θ, p) = constant universalAltθ ∈ Θ,
and the densities satisfying the above equality identify a class of objective priors. We set the constant to 1 and show
later that this choice is without loss of generality. The criterion defining this class of priors is clearly objective, for if the
scoring rule were not constant, some parts of the spaceΘwould be given preference above others.
As discussed in Parry et al. (2012), any proper scoring rule is equivalent to the log score, − log p(θ), also known as the self
information loss function. The log score has the property of depending on p only through its value at θ, which is known
as the local property. However, the above scoring rule lacks the flexibility for assigning an objective prior. For if we set
− log p(θ) = constant, we only achieve p(θ) ∝ 1.
To solve this, we consider additionally the Hyvärinen scoring rule (Hyvärinen, 2005), whichmakes use of the first two
derivatives of p , written as p′ and p′′. We then have a scoring rule S (θ, p)which has two components; the log score and
the Hyvärinen score. Finding solutions to S (θ, p) = 1will now involve solving a second order differential equation and
6 1.4 INVARIANCE
we obtain the class of prior through the two constants connected with the two derivatives.
While the prior is deemed objective through the setting of the scoring rule to be a constant, we show that the prior
distribution which solves S (θ, p) = 1 has an alternative derivation using variational methods; that is S (θ, p) = 1 is a
solution to the Euler–Lagrange equation forminimising ∫
Θ
L(θ, p, p′)dθ, where L represents information in p , indeed
a combination of the differential entropy information, given by ∫ p(θ) log p(θ)dθ, and the Fisher information, given
by ∫ p′(θ)2/p(θ)dθ. There is then an elegant alternative interpretation of obtaining the class of objective prior, which
involves information aspects of the prior distribution itself.
In higher dimensions, where the parameter space is (θ1, . . . , θk ), and there are no constraints between parameters, we
assume prior independence among the components and construct the prior as
p(θ1, . . . , θk ) =
k∏
j=1
p j (θj ),
where each p j (θj ) is a prior derived with our proposed approach.
While we could theoretically obtain themultivariate prior it is convenient to assume independence, as is commonly
donewith objective priors, for example as with the independent Jeffreys prior. Indeed, we argue that in the absence
of any prior information about possible constraints between the parameter spaces, the assumption of independence
is an appropriate representation of absence of information. Note that, although reference priors allow us to obtain
priors for multidimensional parameter spaces, they have the downside, when it is possible to find them, in that the yield
a prior which depends on the order in which the parameters are considered. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to see the
use of independence Jeffreys prior for multidimensional cases, as in Fonseca et al. (2008) or Rubio and Liseo (2014),
given that it can still remain the best (or only) option in this situations. Nevertheless, in Section 2we do describe the full
multivariate solution.
1.4 Invariance
A fundamental point of discussion about prior distributions and, in particular, objective prior distributions, is invariance.
Indeed, Jeffreys’ rule to derive a prior distribution for the parameters of a given model is based on an invariance
requirement, in particular on invariance under one-to-one reparameterizations. Also, other common objective priors,
such as reference priors, have been shown to be invariant and the same apply, for example, to the priors in Simpson et al.
(2017).
Here we discuss invariance from two opposite perspectives: that it is not important, and that it is important. Before
discussing this apparent contradiction, we need to point out that we define the objective prior by setting the scoring
rule equal to a constant, that is S (θ, p(θ)) = constant, is invariant under location transformations.
The core of the discussion about invariance revolves around transformations that are not of the location type. In general,
we have the choice of themodel f (· |θ) defining the parameter spaceΘwhich, in turn, defines the prior pθ (θ). For a non
location transformation, sayφ = φ(θ), it is that f (· |φ) defines pφ (φ) via S (φ, pφ (φ)) = constant and, in general∫
{θ: f (·|θ)∈A}
pθ (θ)dθ ,
∫
{φ: f (·|φ)∈A}
pφ (φ)dφ, (3)
so the prior distributions under the two scenarios are different. As an example, consider the transformation from a
probability (e.g. the parameter of a Bernoulli distribution) to negative log; i.e. φ = − log θ, for which the parameter space
changes from (0, 1) to (0,∞).
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The question is whether this has any practical implications given that only one of the two priors in (3) will be used.
Current model based objective procedures are bound to throw away some coherence properties to achieve invariance,
see Kass andWasserman (1996). However, our point is that there is no practical consequence of any relevance arising
from the lack of invariance, given that, as mentioned above, a single parameterization will be used. For example, in the
case the chosenmodel is the normal density, one either considers the precision parameter or the variance parameter,
not both.
The above points of discussion are concernedwith the perspective that invariance is not important. To consider the
opposite point of view let us assume that there is a canonical parameterization for themodel f (· |θ). Certainly, for most
models the set of parameters for which priors would be assigned is obvious. For example, the exponential family has
f (x |θ) = h(x ) exp

p∑
j=1
θj Tj (x ) − A(θ)

with θ = (θ1, . . . , θp ) being the canonical parameterization. We can then define the canonical objective prior for
statistical model f (· |θ), θ ∈ Θ, as
pΘ(θ) =
p∏
j=1
pΘj (θj ),
whereΘ = ⊗p
j=1
Θj . Then, any transformed prior can be obtained in the usual way involving variable transformations;
that is p(φ) = |J | pΘ(θ(φ)), where J is the Jacobianmatrix for the transformation.
1.5 Objectivity and uniqueness
Before proceeding further it is important to discuss uniqueness and flexibility associated with objective priors. It is
widely acknowledged that a prior representing total ignorance is elusive (and it might not even be possible to obtain
in principle, see Bernardo and Smith (1994)). As a consequence, any prior distribution, objective or not, must out of
necessity provide some knowledge about something, and this “something” is not necessarily unique. For example, given
a particular problem the corresponding objective prior over a given parameter space could be proper or improper;
differentiable everywhere or not; convex; log-concave; etc. In other words, a prior can be objective and exhibit desirable
features of choice without impinging on subjective components relating to information.
So while wewill be introducing a Bayesian objective prior criterion, it does not lead to a unique prior, rather to a class
of priors, where some desirable featuresmay ormay not be included. We believe that this level of flexibility is a point
of strength of the proposed approach, making it adaptable to different scenarios, including those wheremodel based
priors do not work. Indeed, model based priors may lead to uniqueness, yet they provide features, mostly improperness,
whichmay not actually be desirable. For example, Jeffreys prior for the parameter of a Bernoulli distribution has the
feature of having spikes at 0 and 1. On the other hand, the class of objective priors that are defined by our method
contains both proper and improper priors so, for example, the objective prior on a location parameter can be the flat
prior (i.e. the usual objective prior obtained, for example, by applying Jeffreysmethod) but can be proper as well (for
example, to be used for the location parameters in mixturemodels).
The definitions of objective priors are vague and certainly encompass our choice. In Berger (2006) the following four
definitions of objective Bayes are listed in order of generality;
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1. A major goal of statistics (indeed science) is to find a completely coherent objective Bayesian methodology for
learning from data.
2. Objective Bayesian analysis is the best method for objectively synthesizing and communicating the uncertainties
that arise in a specific scenario, but is not necessarily coherent in amore general sense.
3. Objective Bayesian analysis is a convention we should adopt in scenarios in which a subjective analysis is not tenable.
4. Objective Bayesian analysis is simply a collection of ad hoc but useful methodologies for learning from data.
The claim is that 1. is not attainable; 2. is achievable (though not always); while 3. should always hold and should be
always implemented.
If we consider the above definitions given by Berger (2006), we note the possibility of some degree of flexibility in an
objective approach. As a starting point of discussion, let us consider the properness of the prior and let us assume that
we are able to obtain, through the same procedure, a proper as well as an improper prior for a given parameter space;
say, themean of a normal density when the variance is known. Asmentioned above, Jeffreys (and the reference) prior
propose the flat prior p(µ) ∝ 1. This solution is in general sensible and it would lead to a proper posterior. However,
as discussed in the Example 1.2.1 above, the flat prior will not be applicable to a mixture model with more than two
components. In this scenario, it would be desirable (and sensible) to have the flexibility of using the same objective
criterion and obtain a proper prior. In fact, if we consider the possibility of having a proper prior by leveraging on the
flexibility of an objective method we surely satisfy the points from Berger (2006). With respect to the above four
descriptions of objective Bayes, we see that points 3. and 4. are quite obvious, as themethodology will surely be useful
and it would be employed in a scenario where prior information is not available (or cannot be used). The choice of
properties in a prior, such as properness, is not strictly a subjective action; in particular if it is driven by common sense
(i.e. there are no alternatives). Furthermore, we argue that flexibility fits into point 2. as it is objective within a specific
scenario. If we need proper objective priors for themeans on the components of a mixturemodel, then that particular
choice is objective.
1.6 Literature review
The development of objective priors has been prolific in recent years. The idea is that in a scenario where prior
elicitation is not feasible, or not desirable, a prior distribution can be formed through structural or formal rules (Kass
andWasserman, 1996). Although a thorough review of objective Bayesianmethods is beyond the scope of this paper,
we deem it appropriate to briefly list themost common proposals. The first approach is due to Laplace (1820) with the
principle of insufficient reason which leads to uniform, or flat, prior distributions. The most popular objective prior
is Jeffreys prior (Jeffreys, 1946, 1961), who proposed a prior distribution for continuous parameter spaces which is
invariant for one–to–one transformations of the parameter space. For example, if we consider the sampling distribution
f (x |θ), the corresponding Jeffreys prior is given by p(θ) ∝ √I (θ), where I (θ) is the Fisher information. Although in
scenarios where there is only one parameter of interest, Jeffreys prior yields sensible posterior distributions. However,
in cases where the parameter space has a dimension of two ormore, the prior is known to yield posteriors with poor
performance (sometimes giving paradoxical results, such as themarginalisation paradox). In such cases the priors are
taken to be independent.
Although other more general invariance priors have been proposed, such as in Dawid (1983), Hartigan (1964) and
Jaynes (1968), the reference prior of Bernardo represents an alternative to Jeffreys prior. Here the idea is to derive a
prior distribution which carries as minimal information as possible. The prior is identified as the onewhichmaximises
the (expected) missing information between the prior and the posterior. The most up–to–date results on reference
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priors can be found in Berger et al. (2009) and, for an extension to discrete parameter spaces, in Berger et al. (2012). A
limitation of reference priors is sensitivity to the order of importance of parameters; this issue and possible solutions
have been discussed in Berger et al. (2015).
Other objective priors proposed include that ofBox andTiao (1973), basedondata–translated likelihoods, andmaximum
entropy priors, see for example Jaynes (1957, 1968). The first type aims to use uniform priors in models where the
likelihood can be translated producing posteriorswhich, for different samples, have the same shape and differ in location
only. As discussed in Kass (1990), these priors turn out to be very restrictive.
Another important class of objective priors are the probability matching priors, first proposed in Welch and Peers
(1963). The aim is to obtain a prior distribution under which the posterior probabilities of certain regions coincide with
their coverage probabilities, either exactly or approximately. For example, if we consider themodel f (x |θ), and t (p, α) is
the α–quantile of the posterior, and
Pf {θ ≤ t (p, α) |x } =
∫ t (p,α)
−∞
p(θ |x )dθ = α ,
then p(θ) is a probability matching prior. Recent developments of this method can be found in Sweeting et al. (2006) and
Sweeting (2008).
A different method, based on information theoretical concepts, has been proposed by Zellner andMin (1993), giving
the so calledmaximal data information prior. Although themethod gave rise to some interesting results, such as the
derivation of the right-Haar measure for location-scale problems, applications remain limited.
Possibly, the most recent development in defining prior distributions, although not in a strictly objective sense, is
discussed in Simpson et al. (2017). The idea is to identify the parts in a complex model that require subjective input,
while the remaining can be associated to non-informative priors. The comparison between a simple model, say f0(· |η0)
and a richer andmore flexible alternative, say f (· |η), is done by assigning a prior on η that penalises for complexity (on
the basis of the Kullback–Leibler divergence between the twomodels). The other parameters (may) have objective
priors assigned upon.
Afinal consideration is reserved for discrete parameter spaces, whose systematic discussion can be seen to be generated
by the paper of Rissanen (1983). The lack of general methods, due to the challenges that discreteness imposes, has been
filled by Berger et al. (2012) first, and by Villa andWalker (2015) later.
As previously mentioned, for a recent and thorough review of the objective Bayesian approaches so far developed, we
refer the reader to Consonni et al. (2018).
1.7 Organisation of the paper
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2we introduce the foundations of the proposed prior on the basis of scoring
rules and their properties. An interesting aspect of the prior based on scoring rules is its interpretation in terms of the
information content carried by the prior itself. This aspect is explored in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the objective
priors concentrating onΘ = (0, 1), (0,∞) and (−∞,+∞). The implementation of the prior for some specific applications
is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 is dedicated to some final remarks.
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2 | PRIORS FROM SCORING RULES
Let us consider a quantity of interest, θ, which can take values in the space Θ. The fundamental argument behind
objective prior distributions is that they should represent a state of actual or alleged prior ignorance about the true
value of θ. Several criteria have been proposed to select such a prior, all of which assume that a probabilistic model
generating the data (given θ) has been chosen. What we propose is to avoid this choice and derive a prior depending on
Θ only. The idea is tomeasure the quality of the prior p with a proper scoring function, say S (θ, p), and assume it to be
constant, as discussed in the Introduction.
Definition A density p with respect to the Lebesquemeasure onΘ, is objective (in accordance with commonly accepted
meaning of the expression) if S (θ, p) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ,where S is a proper scoring rule.
Before proceeding we provide a brief discussion on scoring rules. Scoring rules are proper if ∫
Θ
S (θ, p) q (θ)dθ is mini-
mized at p = q and local if it depends on p only through the value p(θ). The unique proper local scoring rule is the log
score, defined as
SL (θ, p) = − log p(θ). (4)
Parry et al. (2012) extend the local property tom–local, in that now S (θ, p) depends also on the l -derivative p (l )(θ), for
0 ≤ l ≤ m . In particular, form = 2, there is the Hyvärinen scoring rule, (Hyvärinen, 2005), given by
SH (θ, p) = ∂
2
∂θ2
log p(θ) + 1
2
{
∂
∂θ
log p(θ)
}2
. (5)
Consequently, our choice of scoring rule is
S (θ, p) = SL (θ, p) + SH (θ, p)
= − log p(θ) + p′′(θ)
p(θ) −
1
2
{
p′(θ)
p(θ)
}2
. (6)
That this is a proper scoring rule is derived from the fact that it is a sum of two proper scoring rules. It is also clearly
2–local. Previously, priors have been sought based solely on log p ; for example, the reference prior, and the math
becomes unnatural as a consequence. On the other hand, including higher derivatives yields well defined solutions to
optimization procedures. That we set this score to 1 for all θ is donewithout loss of generality, as we shall see later on.
That we understand this to be an objective procedure is evident from the fact that no part ofΘ is being given preference;
the loss at θ for our choice of p(θ) is the same for all θ. For, if S (θ, p) did depend on θ thenwe argue that this could only
be driven by information; i.e. parts ofΘ space are preferential to others.
It is to be noted that we have summed the two scores directly without introducing anyweighting; for we could have used
Sw (θ, p) = SL (θ, p) +w SH (θ, p). The choice ofw = 1 is a calibration issue between the two scores; i.e. to put them on a
comparable scale. The reason forw = 1 is that for the benchmark standard normal density function, i.e. p(θ) ∝ e− 12 θ2 ,
the difference between the scores SL and SH is a constant (i.e. does not depend on θ), and so one does not end up
dominating the other, only forw = 1.
Hence, we see that the objective prior p(θ) is obtained by solving the following differential equation:
p′′(θ)
p(θ) −
1
2
{
p′(θ)
p(θ)
}2
= 1 + log p(θ). (7)
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To derive the solution, we have the following result.
Theorem 1 The solution to (7) is given by p(θ) ∝ e−u(θ) with u solving
u′(θ) = ±
√
ceu(θ) − 2{1 + u(θ)},
for some suitable constant c .
Proof Solving the differential equation (7) is equivalent to solving the following differential equation;
u(θ)′′ − 1
2
{u(θ)′ }2 = u(θ), (8)
where we have u(θ) = − log p(θ). Strictly we have u′′ − 12 (u′)2 = u − 1 but if u solves this then u + 1 solves (8). The 1 here
is the same onewhich appears in the S (θ, p) = 1 and hence confirming the “without loss of generality” in the choice of 1
as a constant. By now letting v = u′ we have
v
dv
du
= u +
1
2
v 2,
which has the solution
v (θ) = u′(θ) = ±
√
ceu(θ) − 2{1 + u(θ)}, (9)
for a suitable c .
Themissing pieces in equation (9) are c and say u(0), two constants of integration. Wewill see how to complete these
when we look at illustrations in Section 4. In general, as the solution depends on the above two arbitrary constants,
our method provides a class of solutions, where some are proper and some are improper and, more general, where the
priors will have some assigned properties via specification of (c,u(0)).
We also note here that we do not need the normalizing constant for p and neither do we need to find an explicit solution
for u , and p , beyond (9). The reason for this is that we can find an accurate solution via numerical methods; i.e. if we have
u(θ) at a particular θ value, thenwe can evaluate
u(θ + ε) = u(θ) + εu′(θ) + 1
2
ε2u′′(θ) + o(ε2)
for small ε, and the u′ and u′′ are available explicitly, with u′ as in equation (9), u′′ = 12 ceu − 1, and with the ease of
obtaining higher derivatives if needed. From here we can evaluate p(θ).
Finally, in this section, we describe themultidimensional solution. So suppose that θ = (θ1, . . . , θk ). Without needing to
replicate themathematics, we can easily derive the solution as p(θ) ∝ exp(−u(θ))with
∂u/∂θj = ±
√
cj eu(θ) − 2(1 + u(θ)), j = 1, . . . , k ,
where the additional free parameters are the (cj ). We can again solve for u using themultivariate version of the Taylor
approximation.
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3 | VARIATIONAL PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Herewe provide an alternative derivation of (7) using information theory, specifically entropy information and Fisher
information. We show that the p solving (7) can also be regarded as a density carryingminimal local information. This
material then is to provide support for the solution to (7) being an objective prior.
The entropy information (negative entropy) of a density function p is given by
IE (p) =
∫
p(θ) log p(θ)dθ,
which is related to Shannon’s entropy and is equal to negative the expected self–information loss. In addition to IE (p),
we consider ameasure of the information in the density p known as Fisher information, given by
IF (p) =
∫
p′(θ)2
p(θ) dθ =
∫
p(θ)
{
∂
∂θ
log p(θ)
}2
dθ. (10)
See for example Bobkov et al (2014).
Now consider I (p) = IE (p) + 12 IF (p) and the aim is to find the p whichminimizes I (p). Recalling variational methods
(Rustagi, 1976), if we wish tominimise ∫ b
a
L(θ, p, p′)dθ, a necessary condition for a local extremum of the integral of the
Lagrangian L(θ, p, p′) is that
∂L
∂p
=
d
dθ
∂L
∂p′
. (11)
Minimising ∫ b
a
L(θ, p, p′)dθ reduces to the classical calculus of variation problem where we want to extremize the
integral of the function
L(θ, p, p′) = 1
2
p′(θ)2
p(θ) + p(θ) log p(θ). (12)
The solution to the extremal problem, if it exists, is obtained from theEuler–Lagrange equations, given by (11). According
to page 44 of Rustagi (1976), if L(p, p′) is strictly convex on (0,∞) × (−∞,+∞), and p satisfies the Euler equation, then p
is a minimum of ∫ b
a
L(θ, p, p′)dθ. Now L(p, p′) is strictly convex if thematrix
H =
©­­­«
∂2L/∂p2 ∂2L/∂p∂p′
∂2L/∂p∂p′ ∂2L/∂(p′)2
ª®®®¬
is positive definite.
Theorem 2 Aminimum satisfying the Euler–Lagrange equations is given by the p solving the differential equation
p′ = ±p
√
c/(e p) + 2 log p,
for some suitable c .
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Proof Calculations give
H =
1
p
©­­­«
κ2 + 1 −κ
−κ 1
ª®®®¬
where κ = p′/p . This is easily seen to be a positive definite matrix; the eigenvalues are given by
1
p
[
1
2 (2 + κ2) ±
√
1
4 (2 + κ2)2 − 1
]
,
which are positive.
Then equation (11), after some elementary algebra and differentiation, leads to the following differential equation,
p′′(θ)
p(θ) −
1
2
{
p′(θ)
p(θ)
}2
= 1 + log p(θ),
which is the same as (7).
This differential equation has the solution derived in the previous section. It is interesting that the Euler–Lagrange
equations are solved by precisely the same p solving equation (7).
4 | ILLUSTRATIONS
To illustrate the proposedmethodwe consider three common parameter spaces. In particular, we consider the space
for a parameter representing a probability, that is Θ = (0, 1), the space Θ = (0,∞), usually representing the support
of scale parameters and, finally, the support for (location) parametersΘ = (−∞,+∞). The aim here is to solve (11) for
particularmotivated choices of (c,u(0)), equivalently, (c, p(0)) or (p′(0), p(0)). In fact, the solutions to the Euler–Lagrange
equations aremany, and the choice of the two constants (c,u(0))will then determine a unique solution.
Now there is the flat solution for allΘ in (7) given by p(θ) ∝ 1. This is achieved by setting c = 2 and u(0) = 0. However, in
each of the settings ofΘ consideredwe can find alternate priors with particular features. So, e.g. forΘ = (0, 1)we ask
that p(0) = p(1) = 0 and forΘ = (0,∞)we ask that p is convex and decreasing.
CaseΘ = 0, 1.
Here we consider the u function, recall p ∝ e−u , and so for p(0) = p(1) = 0we require u(0) = u(1) = ∞. For additional
symmetry, we can take u
(
1
2
)
= w > 0 and taking c = 2 as the extremal value, we have
u′ =
√
2
√
eu − 1 − u θ > 12
u′ = −√2√eu − 1 − u θ < 12 .
Note there is a discontinuity in the derivative of u at θ = 12 . Asw increases it is that u(0) and u(1) got to∞. A plot of u
is given in Fig. 1 forw = 1.1 and in Fig. 2 forw = 1.14. For these figures we used a grid of 1000 either side of θ = 12 to
obtain the numerical solutions. In the latter case, the corresponding density for p is presented in Fig. 3.
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F IGURE 3 Numerical solution for normalized p withw = 1.14
It also possible to obtain a prior that mimics Jeffreys’; that is, a distribution that has spikes at θ = 0 and θ = 1with the
lowest value at θ = 12 . This is done by simply inverting u : i.e. set u = −u in the above prior.
CaseΘ = 0,∞.
For a prior defined on the space (0,∞)we require a specific shape property for p (convex and decreasing) and then take
extremal values for the c and u(0). This property is common tomost objective priors on (0,∞). Thus, since p′ < 0we
require u′ > 0 and so u′ = √ceu − 2(1 + u), and for u′ to exist for all u wemust have c ≥ 2. Thus, as an extremal value, we
take c = 2.
For the prior to be convex we require p′′ ≥ 0. Now p′ = −u′p implying p′′ = p {(u′)2 − u′′}. Therefore, p is convex when
(u′)2 ≥ u′′. From (8) and (9) we have (u′)2 = ceu − 2(1 + u) and u′′ = 12 c eu − 1, and hence we are interested in the
u(0) for which c = 2 ≥ 2(1 + 2u)e−u for all u ; i.e. (1 + 2u)e−u ≤ 1 for all u . Given that the function (1 + 2u)e−u is maximum,
with a value of 1.31, at u = 12 , and u is increasing, since u′ > 0, we need u(0) > 12 and (1 + 2u(0))e−u(0) = 1, again as an
extremal value. Solving this gives a value for u(0) of approximately 1.31.
In the next result we show that u′ is bounded away from0, and this will have important consequences for the properness
of p .
Lemma 3 It is that u′ is bounded away from 0.
Proof To show this we need to show that eu − 1 − u is bounded away from 0 for u ≥ u(0). This follows trivially since
eu − 1 − u ≥ 12u2 ≥ 12u(0)2.
The result of Lemma 3 has also the implication that p is a proper density function. To show this, we require Gronwall’s in-
equality (Gronwall, 1919). This inequality states that, if f and g are real valued functions onΘ = (0,∞), g is differentiable
on int(Θ), and g ′(t ) ≤ g (t ) f (t ) for all t ∈ Θ then g (t ) ≤ g (0) exp
{∫ t
0
f (s)ds
}
.
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Lemma 4 If p(0) < ∞, it is that p(θ) ≤ p(0) e−θ , and hence p is proper.
Proof Since p′ = −u′ p andwe have u′ ≥  for some  > 0, it is that p′ ≤ − p . FromGronwall’s lemma, with f (t ) = −
and g = p , we have that
p(θ) ≤ p(0) exp
{
−
∫ θ
0
 ds
}
,
and hence the proof is complete.
To have a graphical image, in Figure 4 we plot the prior using the approximation available via a numerical solution to the
differential equation for p . Note that this is the unnormalised p .
F IGURE 4 Global prior distribution for the caseΘ = [0,∞), with c = 2 and u(0) = 1.31
CaseΘ =−∞,+∞.
A solution here is a symmetric version of the caseΘ = (0,+∞), which will represent a proper prior.
On the other hand, if we ask that p is smooth at the origin, i.e. p′(0) = 0, then we need u′(0) = 0 and hence wemust take
(c,u(0)) to satisfy c eu(0) = 2+ 2u(0). If nowwe take c = 2, then u(θ) is a constant, resulting in a flat (improper) prior for p .
For a proper prior here one could take u(0) to be small, say u(0) = 0.01 and then to take c = 2{1 + u(0)}/exp{u(0)}. We
computed numerically the right side; i.e. the (0,∞) side, for p , which is shown in Fig. 5.
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F IGURE 5 Right side of (unnormalized) prior p which is proper and differentiable at origin
Tomake the value of u(0)more diverted, we could equally set amotivated choice for p(0) = 1/{σ√2pi }, corresponding
to a normal density with zeromean and variance σ2.
5 | APPLICATIONS
Althoughwe do not have an explicit form for p(θ), we can use (9) to calculate it numerically quite easily. In particular, if
we know p(θ) then we calculate p(θ + δθ) for small δθ, hence setting up the possibility of a posterior estimation process
viaMetropolis–Hastings sampling. The algorithm employed is detailed in the Appendix.
To be specific, suppose we are currently at θ and the proposal value is θ′. The acceptance probability is
α = min
{
1,
l (θ′)
l (θ)
p(θ′)
p(θ)
q (θ |θ′)
q (θ′ |θ)
}
, (13)
where l (θ) is the likelihood function, and q (θ′ |θ) is the proposal density. The evaluation of p(θ′)/p(θ) in equation (13)
does not represent any particular challenge. In fact, we have p(θ′)/p(θ) = exp{−[u(θ′) − u(θ)]},where u is the solution
of the differential equation
u′ =
√
ceu − 2(1 + u). (14)
Equation (14) allows us to evaluate u(θ′) − u(θ) numerically, via
u(θ′) ≈ u(θ) + (θ′ − θ)u′(θ) + (θ
′ − θ)2
2
u′′(θ) + (θ
′ − θ)3
6
u′′′(θ),
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where u′(θ) = √ceu(θ) − 2(1 + u(θ)), u′′(θ) = 12 ceu(θ) − 1, and
u′′′(θ) = 12 ceu(θ)
√
ceu(θ) − 2(1 + u(θ)),
and so on. Depending on how far θ′ is from θ we can either use the direct approximation just given or otherwise get
from θ to θ′ using smaller step sizes.
Before showing the results of a thorough simulation study in Section 5.4, we consider the following two applications
based on single i.i.d. samples:
1. X1, . . . ,Xn ∼ Poisson(θ), where we assume our prior on the unknown parameter θ > 0, that is a sample space (0,∞).
2. X1, . . . ,Xn ∼ N(µ, 1), where we assume our prior on the unknown parameter µ ∈ Ò, that is a sample space (−∞,∞).
In the first illustration we sample n = 100 observations from a Poisson distribution with mean value θ = 2.5. The
Metropolis–Hastings has been runwith c and u(0) set as discussed in Section 4, and the results for 100,000 iterations
are shown in Figure 6 (posterior sample) and in Figure 7 (posterior histogram). Both figures show a goodmixing and a
posterior distribution that accumulates around the true parameter value.
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F IGURE 6 Posterior chain for θ of a Poisson distribution withmean θ = 2.5.
For the second illustration we have sampled n = 100 observations from a normal density withmean µ = 5 and (known)
variance equal to one. Here, for a total of 100,000 iterations, we had the results in Figure 8 (posterior sample) and
Figure 9 (posterior histogram). In this case too the results are satisfactory.
5.1 Mixturemodels
In this section we discuss the application of the proposed method to a scenario where objective priors have been
notoriously challenging. If we consider mixturemodels, it is well known that the use of objective priors (Grazian and
Robert, 2018) has to be done carefully, as this type ofmodel is subject to issues related to non-identifiability, unbounded
likelihoods, etc. The fact is that improper priors may not be appropriate as wemight not observe outcomes from every
component of themixture (Titterington et al., 1985). For example, Grazian and Robert (2018) show that Jeffreys prior
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F IGURE 7 Posterior histogram for θ of a Poisson distribution withmean θ = 2.5.
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F IGURE 8 Posterior chain for µ of a normal density withmean µ = 5.
is suitable for mixtures of normal densities only in certain circumstances; that is when the unknown parameters are
the weights. If the unknown parameters are themeans or the variances, then using Jeffreys prior leads to improper
posteriors. In particular, if the unknown parameters are the means only, we need at most two components to have
proper posteriors; while, if the unknown parameters are the variance or the mean and the variances, then Jeffreys
priors are not suitable for inference. The authors also generalise the result to any type of mixture.
Given that the objective prior we propose is proper, it allows tomake inference on the parameters of a mixture density
as the yielded posteriors will be proper. As an illustration, we consider amixture of three normal densities, where the
weights and the parameters of the components are unknown. In particular, we sample from the followingmodel
f (y |ω1,ω2,ω3, µ1, µ2, µ3,σ21 ,σ22 ,σ23 ) =
3∑
i=1
ωiN (µi ,σ2i ), (15)
with weightsω1 = 0.25,ω2 = 0.35 andω3 = 0.40, means µ1 = −3.5, µ2 = 0 and µ3 = 2.5, and variances σ21 = 0.5, σ22 = 0.1
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F IGURE 9 Posterior histogram for µ of a normal density withmean µ = 5.
and σ23 = 1.2. Note that we have chosenmixture components that are reasonably distant, so not to be forced to impose
any constraint to overcome identifiability, as the focus of the paper is not in this sense. However, the implementation
of constraints in that sense is straightforward. For the parameters we have chosen prior independence, where each
prior is the prior on the space (0, 1) for the weights, on the space (−∞,∞) for themeans and on the space (0,∞) for the
variances, in agreement with Section 4. The prior on (−∞,∞) is the symmetrised version fromΘ = (0,∞).
In the first illustration we sample n = 100 observations from the abovemixture. In Figure 10we can see an histogram of
the sampled data.
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F IGURE 10 Sample of size n = 100 frommixture (15).
The posterior distributions have been obtained by implementing theMetropolis sampling defined above within a Gibbs
sampler. Using the same initial settings of c and u(0) as above, for a total of 10,000 iterations, we obtain the results in
Figure 11. The plots show clear convergence of the posterior chains and reasonable inferential results.
In the second illustration we have increased the sample size (n = 250) from the abovemodel (15), performing the same
procedures with the same prior distributions. The histogram of the sample data is in Figure 12, while the posterior
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traces and histograms are in Figure 13.
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F IGURE 12 Sample of size n = 250 frommixture (15).
We see in this case as well good performances of the prior with good inferential results.
5.2 Model comparison
In this section we employ the objective prior in model selection. To illustrate a more comprehensive use, we decide
to compare a Poisson distribution and a geometric distribution for some values of the parameters and for two sample
sizes: n = 30 and n = 100. The problem is then formalised by considering the following twomodels
M1 =
{
f1(x |θ) = θx e−θ/x ! , p1(θ)
}
and M2 = {f2(x |φ) = φ(1 − φ)x , p2(φ)} ,
where p1(θ) is the prior for the case (0,∞), as defined in Section 4, and p2(φ) is the uniform prior on the interval (0, 1). By
setting P (M1) = P (M2), we perform themodel comparison bymeans of the Bayes Factor:
B12 =
m1(x )
m2(x ) =
∫
f1(x |θ)p1(θ) dθ∫
f2(x |φ)p2(φ) dφ
.
The simulation exercise is performed by first drawing 100 samples fromM1 and counting the proportion of times the
BF12 > 1; then, we draw 100 samples fromM2 and count the proportion of times BF12 < 1. ideally, in both cases, we
would like to have a proportion close to 100%. Table 1 and Table 2 show the simulation results for, respectively, n = 30
and n = 100. Under each truemodel we report theminimum and themaximumBayes Factor BF12 and the number of
exceptions, indicating the number of times the “wrong”model is selected. While for n = 100 there are no exceptions,
we note one exceptions in three case for n = 30. Given the amount of information about the truemodel in the data is
limited, the exceptions do not raise any particular concern.
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Truemodel M1 M2 Exceptions
θ φ min max min max M1 M2
5 0.5 611.77 1.07 × 1011 2.97 × 10−45 7.08 × 10−21 0 0
2 0.5 0.69 4.02 × 1005 1.45 × 10−11 0.45 1 0
2 0.2 3.00 4.13 × 1006 2.87 × 10−77 58.39 0 1
2 0.8 0.22 8.15 × 1005 1.66 × 10−23 2.28 × 10−08 1 0
5 0.8 1.28 × 1003 6.58 × 1010 2.92 × 10−60 3.69 × 10−45 0 0
TABLE 1 Model comparison for n = 30. Minimum andmaximumBayes Factor under truemodelM1 (Poisson) and
M2 (geometric) for 100 draws.
Truemodel M1 M2 Exceptions
θ φ min max min max M1 M2
5 0.5 2.47 × 1013 1.68 × 1030 6.62 × 10−132 2.15 × 10−79 0 0
2 0.5 5.13 × 1003 2.90 × 1014 4.10 × 10−31 2.96 × 10−09 0 0
2 0.2 5.87 × 1003 1.76 × 1016 9.43 × 10−127 2.19 × 10−28 0 0
2 0.8 2.80 × 1004 2.40 × 1015 8.97 × 10−67 1.25 × 10−43 0 0
5 0.8 7.57 × 1015 1.39 × 1029 4.96 × 10−189 8.95 × 10−147 0 0
TABLE 2 Model comparison for n = 100. Minimum andmaximumBayes Factor under truemodelM1 (Poisson) and
M2 (geometric) for 100 draws.
5.2.1 Nestedmodels
When models under comparison are nested, there are particular considerations which are needed to be taken into
account; see, for example, Consonni et al. (2013). The point is that a diffuse type prior for the larger model will end up
lacking focus so that themass assigned to the smaller model is toomuch. However, our argument is that if two nested
models are under comparison, it is essential, at least from a coherent point of view, to center the larger prior on the
fixed part of the smaller one. Let us elaborate.
Suppose f (y |θ) for θ ∈ Θ1 is the largermodel and the smaller one is given by θ ∈ Θ0 whereΘ0 ⊂ Θ1. TypicallyΘ1 will
be a higher dimension toΘ0 and to get the latter from the former one fixes a particular value in the higher dimension.
Tomake this concrete, let us consider Example 2.1 fromConsonni et al. (2013), whereM0 : f (y |θ0) is binomial(n, θ0),
with θ0 = 1/4 fixed, andM1 : f (y |θ) is binomial(n, θ), for which a prior for θ, p(θ), is required. Given the nature of the
comparison it is our argument that p(θ)must be centered on θ0.
We can adapt quite easily the prior obtained in Section 4, theΘ = (0, 1), to be centered on 1/4 rather than 12 . Without
repeating themathematics, we can take u(1/4) = w and c = 2 and then
u′ =
√
2
√
eu − 1 − u θ > 1/4
u′ = −√2√eu − 1 − u θ < 1/4.
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For the illustration of the prior p(θ), obtained numerically from u , in Fig 14we tookw = 1.5.
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F IGURE 14 Numerical solution for normalized p withw = 1.5
The proposed prior, centered at θ0 = 0.25, is comparedwith the intrinsic prior in Consonni et al. (2013), that is
pI (θ |b, t ) =
t∑
x=0
Beta(θ |b + x , b + t − x )Bin(x |t , θ0),
where b = 1 and t = 8. The intrinsic prior defined above is centered atwθ0 + (1 −w ) 12 , wherew = t/(2b + t ), and has
behaviour similar to the one in Figure 14, giving the Intrinsic Bayes Factor in favour ofM1
B I10 =
8∑
x=0
B(1 + x + y , 1 + t − x + n − y )
B(1 + x , 1 + t − x )θy0 (1 − θ0)n−y
,
where n = 12. A relatively small sample size allows to better capture differences in the performance of the two priors.
Figure 15 shows the posterior probability forM1, i.e. P (M1 |y ) = (1 + 1/B I10)−1.
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F IGURE 15 Small sample evidence for the Binomial example. The graph shows the posterior probability for model
f (y |θ) = Bin(n = 12, θ) using the proposed prior (squares) and the intrinsic prior (circles).
The priors yieldmodel probabilities that are similar; in fact in both cases the lowest point is at θ = θ0 and, themore θ
moves away from θ0 the higher the posterior probability forM1.
5.3 Poisson regression
In this section we show how the proposed prior can be used in estimating the parameters of a Poisson regressionmodel.
Wewill apply the prior to both simulated and real data.
Let us consider the following Poisson regressionmodel
yi ∼ Poisson(θi ), i = 1, . . . , n
with
θi = exp ©­«
k∑
j=1
xi j βj
ª®¬ .
The covariates are the xi j ’s, with the corresponding vector of parametersβ = (β1, . . . , βk ). In this section we show how
wemake inference on the vectorβ by using the prior in the form p(β) = p(β1) × · · · × p(βk ), where p(βj ) is the prior
defined on the interval (−∞,∞). Again, this prior is the symmetrised version of the prior on (0,∞).
We start by setting k = 5, withβ = (−0.8,−0.5, 0, 0.5, 0.8), and we simulate the covariate values from a multivariate
normal with vector of meansβ and variancematrix a diagonal matrix of dimension k . The vector of observations of the
response variable y is obtained from a Poisson distribution with mean exp(xβ). Applying the algorithm in the Appendix,
with 50,000 simulations and a burn-in period of 25,000, the posterior 95% credible intervals for the β ’s are represented
in the caterpillar plot in Figure 16.
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We can see that the intervals contain the true parameter values, showing the effectiveness of the inferential approach
using the proposed prior. To verify the robustness of the procedure, we have included random noise by adding, first 5
and then another 10, covariates with true value equal to zero. The results are in Figure 17 and Figure 18. Again, we see
that the posterior intervals comprise the true values with no evident impact on their size when noise is added.
To show the application of the prior on a real data set, we consider the n = 78 observations on bilateral sanctions
behaviour, for selected years, in the period 1939–1983 (Martin, 1992). In particular, we replicate the analysis in
Goodrich and Lu (2013), where the number of sanctions (‘num’) is regressed on the political stability and economic
health of the country targeted by the sanction (’target’) and the level of international cooperation (‘coop’). For the
covariates, the coding is described in Tabl 3.
Meaning
Value ‘target’ ‘coop’
1 Severe stress No cooperation
2 Mildy stable Minor cooperation
3 Relatively stable Modest cooperation
4 NA Significant cooperation
TABLE 3 Coding of the covariates representing the political stability and economic wealth of the nation targeted by
the sanction (values from 1 to 3) and of the level of international cooperation (values from 1 to 4).
Therefore, the Poisson regressionmodel will be
yi ∼ Poisson (xi1β1 + xi2β2 + xi3β3) , i = 1, . . . , 78,
where β1 is the intercept, xi1 = 1, for i = 1, . . . , 78, xi2 is the political andwealth level of the target and xi3 the level of
international cooperation; β2 and β3 the corresponding coefficients. Assuming independent prior knowledge, we have
p(β1, β2, β3) = p(β1)p(β2)p(β3) and, as for the simulation above, we assign a prior defined on (−∞,∞) to each coefficient.
In the first step of the analysis we have run 50,000 iterations for 4 chains per parameter, where the starting points have
been randomly chosen. Figure 19 shows the first 10,000 iterations for each parameter where a fast convergence is
clear. To obtain the inferential results, we have therefore focused on a chain and, considering a burn-in period of 25,000
iterations, we have obtained the trace plots and histograms in Figure 20 and the corresponding posterior statistics in
Table 4. In Table 4we have included the posterior summaries obtained by using default priors, that is normal densities
centered at 0 with large variance (Goodrich and Lu, 2013). We can see that the results are very similar, in terms of point
estimate, standard deviation and size of the credible interval.
26 5.4 SIMULATION STUDY
Proposed Prior
Mean sd 95%C.I.
β1 -0.96 0.18 (-1.35,-0.62)
β2 -0.02 0.06 (-0.13,0.09)
β3 1.21 0.05 (1.13,1.30)
Default Prior
Mean sd 95%C.I.
β1 -0.98 0.17 (-1.33,-0.65)
β2 -0.02 0.06 (-0.13,0.09)
β3 1.21 0.05 (1.12,1.31)
TABLE 4 Posterior mean, standard deviation and 95% credible interval for the real data analysis, under the
proposed priors and the default priors.
5.4 Simulation study
For objective priors, it is commonpractice to analyse some frequentist properties of the yielded posteriors. Furthermore,
when available, the performance is compared to the one of other objective priors. We consider two frequentist indexes:
the coverage (COVE) of the 95% credible interval of the posterior distribution and the square root of themean squared
error (MSE) from the posterior mean. Note that, for a scale parameter, say θ, theMSE is computed relatively to the
parameter value; that is√MSE (θ)/θ (RMSE). This is necessary to have amore realistic quantification of the estimation
accuracy, as one would expect the uncertainty to increase as the value of the parameter increases. The study compares
the performances of the proposed prior with the ones of the appropriate Jeffreys prior, which can be considered as
commonly accepted benchmark of reference.
It has to be noted that onewould expect a larger RMSEwhen the proposed prior is used, in comparison to anymodel
based prior. In fact, while the former used as information only the sample space, the latter includes the sampling
distribution as well. Hence, the informational content of the posterior yielded by the proposed prior has to be less than
the one of the posterior yielded by, say, the Jeffreys prior.
The first study considers the Poisson as sampling distribution. We repeat the procedure introduced in Section 5 on 250
samples drawn from a Poissonwith θ = 1, 10, 100, 500. The sample sizes considered are n = 3, n = 10, n = 30 and n = 100.
The small sample sizes, although not very realistic, allow to better discern the performance of the proposed prior in
comparison to the Jeffreys prior. Recalling that, if x ∼ Poisson(θ), then the Jeffreys prior is piJ (θ) ∝ θ−1/2, we present
the comparison in Tables 5 to 8.
Proposed Prior Jeffreys Prior
θ RMSE COVE RMSE COVE
1 0.679 0.95 0.616 0.92
10 0.184 0.94 0.180 0.96
100 0.053 0.94 0.052 0.94
500 0.026 0.92 0.025 0.94
TABLE 5 Frequentist analysis for θ for n = 3, for the proposed objective prior and Jeffreys prior.
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Proposed Prior Jeffreys Prior
θ RMSE COVE RMSE COVE
1 0.316 0.97 0.300 0.96
10 0.100 0.93 0.094 0.94
100 0.034 0.92 0.033 0.93
500 0.014 0.94 0.014 0.96
TABLE 6 Frequentist analysis for θ for n = 10, for the proposed objective prior and Jeffreys prior.
Proposed Prior Jeffreys Prior
θ RMSE COVE RMSE COVE
1 0.188 0.94 0.177 0.94
10 0.056 0.98 0.054 0.95
100 0.019 0.93 0.016 0.94
500 0.008 0.94 0.007 0.97
TABLE 7 Frequentist analysis for θ for n = 30, for the proposed objective prior and Jeffreys prior.
Proposed Prior Jeffreys Prior
θ RMSE COVE RMSE COVE
1 0.093 0.95 0.091 0.97
10 0.030 0.96 0.030 0.95
100 0.010 0.96 0.009 0.94
500 0.004 0.93 0.003 0.95
TABLE 8 Frequentist analysis for θ for n = 100, for the proposed objective prior and Jeffreys prior.
As expected, the RMSE associated to the proposed prior is always larger than the RMSE yielded by the Jeffreys prior
(the two exceptions are amere consequence of rounding). However, the difference tends to be smaller the larger the
sample size, given that the information in the data becomes stronger, so the prior information becomes less important.
The coverage is in line with the behaviour onewould expect from aminimally informative prior, and theMSE increases
as the sample size decreases as there is less information contained in the data. A similar conclusion can be drawn
for the second simulation study, where a normal with known variance is considered. In this case, with observations
from N (µ,σ2) (where σ2 is assumed to be known), where µ = {−5,−4, . . . , 0, . . . , 4, 5}, Jeffreys prior is piJ (µ) ∝ 1. The
reported results have been obtained for σ2 = 1 as there is no impact of the variance on the prior performances.
By inspecting Figure 21, we do not notice any sensible difference, in terms of frequentist performance, between the two
priors, with the exception of a slightly largerMSE for the proposed prior (as expected).
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6 | DISCUSSION
In this paper we have introduced a new class of objective priors derived from scoring rules. A remarkable aspect is
that we have been able to show that the same result can be achieved via the rigour of calculus of variations, by finding
objective priors which solve the Euler–Lagrange equation for finding extremum to integrals of the type∫
L(θ, p, p′)dθ.
If we can establish suitable choices of L(θ, p, p′) which can be motivated and satisfy conditions for the existence of
extremum, then new classes of objective prior can be sought. The case we have considered, which we can consider as a
first step, is to use a combination of twowell knownmeasures of information in a prior density function; i.e.
L(θ, p, p′) = 12
p′(θ)2
p(θ) + p(θ) log p(θ).
The objective priors here defined have two desirable properties. The first is that they are somewhat detached from the
choice of the sampling distribution and are dependent on the parameter space only. In other words, the information
required to derive the prior is limited to the range of values that the quantity of interest can take.
The second property is that the prior can be proper. Besides the advantage of not having to check properness of the
posterior, it allows to exploit the prior in scenarios where improper objective priors have been challenging. For example,
as illustrated in Section 5.1, the proposed prior is used to estimate the means of a mixture of normal densities with
three components. Another potential application, discussed in Section 5.2, is in model selection. In particular, the
objective prior may be used to represent minimal information on the parameters that are not common to twomodels. In
fact, the Bayes factor used to compare twomodels is, in general, sensitive to the proportionality constant of improper
priors. While for common parameters the constant will cancel out, this is not the case if the parameter is either at the
numerator or at the denominator of the ratio only. Hence, the necessity of having a proper prior assigned to this kind of
parameters.
The simulation study, aimed to compare the frequentist performances of the proposed priorwith the ones of the Jeffreys
prior, has shown no appreciable differences, with the exception of a slightly largerMSE for the proposed prior; the last
result is expected as it is a consequence of the smaller information used to define the proposed prior in comparison with
anymodel based objective prior.
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APPEND IX - MCMC ALGOR ITHM
The following algorithm produces aMCMC sample θ(0), θ(1), ..., θ(T ) from the posterior distribution. Suppose to fix the
initial value θ(0) and repeat the following procedure for t = 1, . . . ,T .
Metropolis-Hastings for the prior
Suppose that θ(t ) is the current state of the chain:
1. Draw θ′ from a proposal distribution q (· |θ(t ))
2. Evaluate u(θ′) − u(θ(t )) numerically, via
u(θ′) = u(θ(t )) + (θ′ − θ(t ))u′(θ(t )) + (θ
′ − θ(t ))2
2
u′′(θ(t ))
+
(θ′ − θ(t ))3
6
u′′′(θ(t )) + R ,
where
u′(θ(t )) =
√
ceu(θ(t )) − 2(1 + u(θ(t )))
u′′(θ(t )) = 12 ceu(θ
(t )) − 1
u′′′(θ(t )) = 12 ceu(θ
(t ))
√
ceu(θ(t )) − 2(1 + u(θ(t )))
3. Compute p(θ′)/p(θ(t )) = exp{−[u(θ′) − u(θ(t ))]}
4. Set θ(t+1) = θ′ with probability
α = min
{
1,
l (θ′)
l (θ(t ))
p(θ′)
p(θ(t ))
q (θ(t ) |θ′)
q (θ′ |θ(t ))
}
,
and θ(t+1) = θ(t ) with probability 1 − α
Depending on how far θ′ is from θ we can either use the direct approximation in step 3with higher order derivatives or
otherwise get from θ to θ′ using smaller step sizes.
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F IGURE 11 Posterior traces (left) and histograms (right) for themeans, (a) and (b), the variances, (c) and (d), the
weights, (e) and (f), for a sample of size n = 100 frommixture (15).
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F IGURE 13 Posterior traces (left) and histograms (right) for themeans, (a) and (b), the variances, (c) and (d), the
weights, (e) and (f), for a sample of size n = 250 frommixture (15).
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F IGURE 16 Caterpillar plot representing the 95% credible intervals of the β ’s of a Poisson regression with k = 5
covariates.
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F IGURE 17 Caterpillar plot representing the 95% credible intervals of the β ’s of a Poisson regression with k = 10
covariates.
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F IGURE 18 Caterpillar plot representing the 95% credible intervals of the β ’s of a Poisson regression with k = 20
covariates.
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F IGURE 19 Multiple-trace plots of posterior chains for (a) β1, (b) β2 and (c) β3, for the first 10,000 iterations.
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F IGURE 21 Normal model. Coverage of the 95% credible interval of the posterior for θ = 1, 2, . . . , 10 for n = 30 (a)
and for n = 100 (c), andMSE from themean for n = 30 (b) and for n = 100 (d). Each graph shows the results for the
proposed prior (blue square) and the Jeffreys prior (red diamond).
